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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
BERT JAMES DURRANT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 14478 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ON APPEAL 
Appellant Bert James Durrant appealed a conviction 
of automobile homicide from the Fourth Judicial District, in 
and for Utah County, State of Utah, to this Court, alleging 
that the trial court committed reversible error in: (1) ad-
mitting in evidence an analysis of a blood specimen which was 
illegally seized from Appellant, and (2) refusing to instruct 
the jury on "criminal negligence" as the specific intent re-
quired for the commission of automobile homicide pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, 76-5-207, enacted L. 1973, Ch. 196, and 
in affirmatively instructing the jury that the offense was 
established by proof of "simple" or "ordinary" negligence. 
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DISPOSITION OF THE CASE ON APPEAL 
On March 14, 1977, this Court entered a judgment 
in this case, affirming the judgment of the trial court. 
This Court unanimously found that the blood specimen taken 
from Appellant was not illegally seized and that it was proper 
for the trial court to admit an analysis of the specimen as 
evidence at trial. This Court, by a decision of three to two 
Justices, also found that the trial court did not err in refusi 
to instruct the jury on "criminal negligence" as the specific 
intent required for the commission of automobile homicide pur-
suant to Utah Code Annotated, 76-5-207, enacted L. 1973, Ch. 
196, and in affirmatively instructing the jury that the offense 
was established by proof of "simple" or "ordinary" negligence. 
* State of Utah v. Bert James Durrant, Case No. 14478, S. Ct., 
Utah, Mar. 14, 1977, Maughn, J. and Wilkins, J., dissenting. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING 
Appellant seeks to have this Court reverse its judg-
ment, entered March 14, 1977, with respect to its holding 
that the trial court did not commit reversible error in 
refusing to instruct the jury on "criminal negligence" as the 
specific intent required for the commission of automobile 
homicide pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 76-5-207, enacted 
L. 1973, Ch. 196, and in affirmatively instructing the jury 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that the offense was established by proof of "ordinary" or 
"simple" negligence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
THAT "ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE" IS THE 
INTENT REQUIRED FOR THE COMMISSION 
OF AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE, THIS COURT 
IGNORES THE PROVISIONS OF U.C.A., 
76-5-201, 76-2-201, -AND 76-2-103(4), 
AND RELIES ON CASE LAW WHICH HAS 
BEEN SUPERCEDED BY THESE RECENTLY 
ENACTED STATUTES. 
The trial court instructed the jury that the negli-
gence required for the commission of automobile homicide con-
sisted in "ordinary" or "simple" negligence. Instruction 
No. 8 provided: 
Negligence is the failure to use 
ordinary and reasonable care in the 
management of one's property and 
person. It is the failure to do 
what an ordinary and reasonable 
person would have done under the 
circumstances, or the doing of 
what such a person would not have 
done. The fault may lie in acting 
or in omitting to act. 
Instruction No. 6 provided: 
Under the law of this State any 
person, while under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor to a degree 
which renders him incapable of 
safely driving a vehicle/ who causes 
the death of another by operating 
or driving any automobile in a 
negligent manner on a public highway 
or street shall be deemed guilty of 
a felony. 
- - } _ 
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Conceding that "ordinary" negligence was all that was 
necessary to convict a person of automobile homicide under 
prior Utah law as set forth in Utah Code Annotated, 76-30-7.4, 
enacted L. 1957, repealed by L. 1973, Ch. 196, Appellant argued 
on appeal, that under the new Criminal Code adopted by the 
Utah Legislature in 19 73, the offense of automobile homicide 
had been redefined and included as a form of an offense desig-
nated "criminal homicide" which requires the specific intent 
of, at least, "criminal negligence" for its commission. (Ap. 
Br. on App., at 13, 14) 
Appellant was convicted under Part 2, Criminal Homicide, 
Ch. 5, Offenses Against the Person, of the new Criminal Code. 
Section 76-5-201, as enacted L. 1973, Ch. 196, provides: 
(1) A person commits criminal homicide 
if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly 
or with criminal negligence unlawfully 
causes the death of another. 
(2) Criminal homicide is murder in the 
first and second degree, manslaughter, 
or negligent homicide, or automobile 
homicide. 
The new automobile homicide statute, 76-5-207, enacted 
L. 1973, Ch. 196, under which Appellant was convicted, provides: 
lnUtah Criminal Code", Utah Code Ann., 76-1-101, et.. seq, 
(1953), enacted L. 1973, Ch. 196. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(1) Criminal Homicide constitutes 
automobile homicide if the actor, 
which under the influence of in-
toxicating liquor, a controlled 
substance, or any drug, to a degree 
which renders the actor incapable 
of safely driving a vehicle, causes 
the death of another by operating a 
motor vehicle in a negligent manner. 
Under the new Criminal Code, automobile homicide is 
designated as one form of the offense of criminal homicide. 
The State Legislature has confined the offense of criminal 
homicide to encompass those homicides in which a person 
"intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal 
negligence unlawfully causes the death of another." 
Section 76-2-101, enacted L. 1973, Ch. 196, provides: 
No person is guilty of an offense 
unless his conduct is prohibited 
by law, and 
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, 
recklessly or with criminal negligence 
with respect to each element of the 
offense as the definition of the offense 
requires; or 
(2) His acts constitute an offense 
involving strict liability. 
Section 76-2-103(4), enacted L. 1973, Ch. 196, defines 
the specific intent of "criminal negligence", providing that: 
A person engages in conduct: 
-5-
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* * * 
(4) With criminal negligence or is 
criminally negligent with respect 
to circumstances surrounding his 
conduct or the result of his conduct 
when he ought to be aware of a sub-
stantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the circumstances exist or the result 
will occur. The risk must be of such 
a nature that the failure to perceive 
it constitutes a gross deviation from 
the standard of care that an ordinary 
person would exercise in all the cir-
cumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 
On appeal, Appellant contended that the instruction 
concerning his negligence should have described the specific 
intent required by the above cited statute. Appellant noted 
that a problem arises in interpreting the "intent" required 
for the commission of automobile homicide, because the auto-
mobile homicide statute, 76-5-207, enacted L. 1976, Ch. 196, 
refers only to the "negligent" operation of a motor vehicle 
which results in the death of another. Appellant argued that 
the criminal homicide statute, 76-5-2 01, enacted L. 197 3, 
Ch. 196, encompasses and controls the automobile homicide 
statute, and that, therefore, this Court should reconcile 
the meaning and application of these two statutes, by inter-
preting the term" negligence" in the automobile homicide statute 
to require "criminal negligence" as specified in the criminal 
6 
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homicide statute. Appellant further argued that this inter-
pretation was supported by those sections of the new Criminal 
Code generally governing the imposition of criminal responsi-
bility. (Ap. Br. on App., 14) In addition, Justice Maughn 
correctly notes in his dissenting opinion herein, in which 
he is joined by Justice Wilkins, that the criminal homicide 
provisions of the new Criminal Code are patterned after Article 
210, A.L.I. Model Penal Code, Proposed Officla Draft, May 4, 
1972. The Comments to that Code clearly reveal that the drafters 
of the criminal homicide provisions believed that liability 
for vehicular homicide should not be imposed in the absence 
of negligence of the character defined as "criminal negligence" 
in Utah Code Annotated, 76-2-103(4), enacted L. 1973, Ch. 196, 
of the new Criminal Code. State of Utah v. Bert James Durrant, 
Case No. 144 78, Maughn, J., joined by Wilkins, J., (Dissenting 
Opinion). 
Respondent, on appeal, made no effort to reconcile 
the "negligence" provision of the automobile homicide statute, 
76-5-207, enacted L. 1973, Ch. 196, with the "criminal negli-
gence" requirement of the criminal homicide statute, 76-5-201, 
enacted L. 1973, Ch. 196. In fact, Respondent does not even 
acknowledge the existence of the criminal homicide statute or 
those statutes cited by Appellant (Ap. Br. on App., at 14) 
-7-
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which govern the imposition of criminal responsibility under 
the new Criminal Code, and provide that no act shall be 
punishable under the Code, unless the conduct prohibited is 
undertaken with the specific intent of at least, "criminal 
negligence", except where the offense is a strict liability 
offense. (R. Br. on App., 13-15) Respondent merely asserted 
on appeal that the wording of the automobile homicide statute 
which refers to the "negligent" operation of a vehicle, and 
prior case law, including this Court's decision in State v. 
Risk, 520 P.2d 215 (Utah, 1974), permit automobile homicide 
under the new automobile homicide statute, 76-5-207, enacted 
L. 1973, to be proved by showing that the actor was "ordinarly" 
negligent in the operation of a motor vehicle which results 
in the death of another. (R. Br. on App., 12-15). 
Although this Court recognized the apparent anomaly 
between the "negligence" provision of the automobile homicide 
statute and the "criminal negligence" requirement of the criminal 
homicide statute, the Court reconciled the meaning and applica-
tion of those two statutes by completely ignoring the definition 
of "criminal negligence" provided in Section 76-2-103(4) of 
the new Criminal Code, and by adopting a different definition 
of the term based on Ballentine's Law Dictionary and several 
court decisions of this Court and others, which Appellant 
-8-
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submits are no longer authoritative on the question of what 
constitutes the specific intent of "criminal negligence" in, 
the face of the State Legislature's recent adoption of Utah 
Code Annotated, 76-2-103(4), enacted L. 1973 (1973). State 
v. Bert James Purrant, Case No. 14478, S. Ct. Utah, Mar. 14, 
1977, at 2-3. 
This Court accepted Respondent's contention that 
State v. Risk, 520 P.2d 215 (Utah, 1974), is authority for the 
proposition that "the offense of automobile homicide can be 
proved by simple negligence" under current law. State of Utah 
v. Bert James Purrant, Case No. 14478, S. Ct. Utah, Mar. 14, 
1977, at 3. However, this Court's decision in Risk is not dis-
positive of the instant case for several reasons. 
First, the question of the intent necessary for the 
commission of automobile homicide - "ordinary" versus "criminal" 
negligence, posited in this case - was not before the Court in 
Risk. Indeed, the Appellant there prefaced his argument on 
appeal by conceding that "the offense of automobile homicide, 
Utah Code Ann., 76-30-7.4 (1953), requires only ordinary 
negligence." State v. Risk, 520 P.2d 215 (Utah, 1974), Ap. 
Br. on App., at 2, citing St ate v. John s on, 12 Utah 2d 220, 
364 P.2d 1019 (Utah, 1961). 
Second, and more important, by the time this Court 
-9-
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decided Risk in 1974, the Utah Legislature had expressly re-
pealed the automobile homicide statute under which the defendant 
2 Rish was convicted, and adopted a new Criminal Code, the "Utah 
Criminal Code", Utah Code Annotated, 7 6-1-101, et. seq., enacted 
L. 1973, which redefined automobile homicide as a form of the 
offense of criminal homicide, and provided, for the first time, 
that the specific intent of "criminal negligence" was required 
for the commission of the offense. 
CONCLUSION 
The instant case is the first in which this Court has 
been asked to rule on the state of mind required for the com-
mission of automobile homicide under the pertinent statutes of 
the new Criminal Code. Appellant submits that a proper reading 
of the automobile homicide statute, placing it in the context 
of the criminal homicide statute which encompasses and controls 
its provisions, together with reference to other provisions 
of the new Criminal Code and the legislative history thereof, 
compel the conclusion that the specific intent required for the 
commission of automobile homicide is "criminal negligence". 
Therefore, Appellant respectfully requests this Court to reverse 
its prior judgment and hold that the trial court erred in 
2Utah Code Ann., 76-30-7.4 (1953), as amended (1953). Re-
pealed by L. 1973, Ch. 196. 
-10-
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instructing the jury that automobile homicide requires only 
"simple" or "ordinary" negligence for its commission. 
DATED this /[£>&&/ of April, 1977. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorney for Appellant 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I delivered a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Brief In Support Of Appellant's Petition 
For Reharing to Vernon B. Romney, Attorney General and Earl F. 
Dorius, Assistant Attorney General, 236 State Capital Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah this ~day of April, 1977. 
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